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1 Introduction
In developed and emerging economies alike, a few large cities attract rms paying high
wages to their employees. At the same time, these large metropolitan areas, where housing
costs are high, accommodate a growing number of high-skilled workers. An illustration of
this is provided by the jacket of Morettis recent book The New Geography of Jobs, which
shows a map of the United States suggesting that less than 20 American cities account for
the bulk of the most innovative and productive activities. To be precise, Moretti (2012)
observed that a handful of cities with the rightindustries and a solid base of human
capital keep attracting good employers and o¤ering high wages, while those at the other
extreme, cities with the wrongindustries and a limited human capital base, are stuck
with dead-end jobs and low average wages.Similar maps and conclusions could be drawn
for many other countries (see, e.g. Combes et al., 2008, for the case of France).1
In a path-breaking paper, Krugman (1991) proposed to explain the emergence of
sizeable and lasting regional di¤erence by the integration of markets brought about by the
dramatic fall in transport costs that started with the Industrial Revolution.2 Specically,
Krugman argued that manufacturing activities are dispersed across regions and countries
when transport costs are high because local producers are protected against imported
goods. As transport costs steadily decline, rms and consumers agglomerate in a handful
of places where rms are able to better exploit increasing returns by supplying larger
markets and exporting their output at low cost. In the benchmark case of two symmetric
regions, the symmetric distribution of manufacturing rms breaks down when transport
costs decrease su¢ ciently to reach a certain threshold. Once transport costs fall below this
threshold, the manufacturing sector gets agglomerated in what becomes the core region,
while the now-peripheral region is specialized in farming. This explanation has been
embraced by a great number of authors under the heading of new economic geography
(NEG).
We nd it hard to believe that the sole collapse in transport costs was the reason for
the uneven geographical distribution of activities which emerges in the aftermath of the
Industrial Revolution, as well as for the spatial concentration of human capital. Given
the massive role played by productivity gains in the process of economic development,
we argue in this paper that, regardless of the level of transport costs, a rising labor
productivity explains why some places fare better than others, while the most able workers
tend to cluster in a few places.
To achieve our goal, we develop a parsimonious model with one sector manufacturing
featuring increasing returns and monopolistic competition. Allen (2009) has convincingly
argued that the relative scarcity of labor in Britain, where wages were remarkably high,
had fostered the development of labor-saving technologies that permit the substitution
of capital and energy for labor. For this reason, we nd it reasonable as a rst-order
approximation to focus on labor as the main production factor. Since rms operate under
1The geographical concentration of activities and the clustering of talents are not really new phe-
nomena. The Industrial Revolution exacerbated regional disparities by an order of magnitude that was
unknown before (Pollard, 1981). Less known, perhaps, is that cities grew predominantly through the
concentration of human capital (Hohenberg and Lees, 1985).
2Bairoch (1997) observed that between 1800 and 1910, it can be estimated that the lowering of the
real average prices of transportation was of the order of 10 to 1.Transport costs continued to fall after
World War I. In the United States, Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) noted that over the twentieth century,
the costs of moving manufactured goods have declined by over 90 per cent in real terms.
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increasing returns in our model, labor productivity is expressed through the marginal
and xed labor requirements needed by a rm to produce a variety of the manufactured
good. In this context, technological progress, or rising labor productivity, takes the form
of steadily decreasing marginal or xed requirements of labor. Like Krugman who does
not explain why transport costs fall, we will consider an exogenous technological progress
that permits an increase in the output per worker. In other words, we are agnostic about
the concrete form taken by the various innovations developed before, during and after the
Industrial Revolution. Our model is thus consistent with di¤erent narrative approaches
to technological progress.
Although we recognize that consumers are mobile, it is unquestionable that they bear
positive costs when they change location. These costs are often considered a one-time
expenditure but this view strikes us as being too extreme. Indeed, migration generates
substantial non-pecuniary costs created by di¤erences in languages/dialects, cultures and
religions within and between nations, which have a lasting inuence on individual well-
being (Belot and Ederveen, 2012; Falck et al., 2012). Furthermore, temporary and return
migration is evidence that migrants bear permanent social dislocation costs when they live
away from their country or region of origin (Dustmann and Mestres, 2010). Last, migrants
typically get a lower pay than local consumers who have a better tacit knowledge of social
rules that make them more productive. Summarizing the state of the art, Collier (2013)
asserts that migrants tend to be less happy than the indigenous host population.
The paradigmatic model of NEG focuses on a two-sector economy (manufacturing
and agriculture) with two types of sector-specic labor (workers and farmers). What
matters in Krugman (1991) is that the immobility of farmers plays the role of a dispersion
force. Admittedly, before the Industrial Revolution the agricultural sector proper was
large, but this is no longer in modern economies where the primary sector accounts for
a very small share of the gross domestic product.3 In this paper, we consider a new
setting that ts better developed and emerging economies alike: the economy involves
only the manufacturing sector, but workers are imperfectly mobile. By incentivizing
consumers to stay put even when they may be guaranteed a higher living standard in other
places, migration costs may be viewed as a force that fosters the stickiness of activities.
In addition, labor productivity rises when the xed labor requirement, the marginal labor
requirement, or both, fall. The distribution of rms and consumers is thus determined by
the interplay between labor productivity and migration costs.
Our main two ndings may be summarized as follows. First, when labor productivity
starts rising, the set of stable equilibria shrinks. In the limit, when one region is initially
bigger than another even by a trie all rms and consumers get agglomerated in the
larger region. To put it di¤erently, even in the absence of falling transport costs, rising
labor productivity is su¢ cient to explain why the manufacturing sector is agglomerated.
We thus provide a new and historically relevant explanation for the geographical concen-
tration of economic activities that started with the Industrial Revolution. Observe that
technological progress magnies any interregional di¤erence, whereas market integration
reduces wage and price di¤erentials between regions in NEG. By implication, a hike in
the productivity of labor that leads to falling production costs is not equivalent to falling
3The term agriculture should not be taken literally. This sector includes all production activities
bound to the land, such as mining and farming, as well as activities using immobile inputs, such as
tourism. In France, which is a major provider of touristic services, agriculture and tourism account
together for less than 10 per cent of the French GDP in 2012.
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transport costs. Note also that a lower marginal labor requirement leads to an increase
in rmsoutput, but does not a¤ect the number of rms. In contrast, a decreasing xed
labor requirement triggers the entry of new rms, which all rms keep producing the same
output.
Second, in the absence of technological progress in the manufacturing sector, falling
transport costs do not trigger the agglomeration of rms. The intuition is easy to grasp.
Since interregional price and wage di¤erences narrow down when transport costs fall,
consumers have lower incentives to move. As a consequence, if the utility di¤erential is
not su¢ ciently large to spark consumersmigration when transport costs are high, this is
even more so when transport costs are low.
How does this compare to NEG? When labor productivity is low, a wide range of
distributions may be sustained as stable spatial equilibria, including the dispersed and
agglomerated distributions. By contrast, when labor productivity is high, the set of
equilibrium distributions that are (partially) dispersed is narrow. In addition, various
congurations remain stable even when transport costs take on low values. For example,
when rms and consumers are a priori dispersed, they will remain so even when markets
are very integrated. These two results clash with what NEG tells us. The reason for such
a major di¤erence in results is to be found in the presence of migration costs. Regardless
of the level of transport costs, positive migration costs always prevent a marginal change
in locations from destabilizing an equilibrium distribution, the reason being that small
welfare gains are not su¢ cient to compensate workers for the cost they bear when they
move to the more prosperous region. Does this mean that migration costs must be absent
when explaining the agglomeration of economic activities in a few regions? Happily
enough, we will show that the answer is no.
Finally, recall that Pollard (1981) argued that, during the Industrial Revolution, the
core regions attracted from the peripheral regions some of their most active and adaptable
labour.Focussing on the contemporary period, Moretti (2012) asserts that geographi-
cally, American workers are increasingly sorting along educational lines.In an attempt to
account for this fact, we assume that workers are heterogeneous in that they are endowed
with di¤erent amounts of e¢ ciency units of labor. Under such circumstances, we show
that the more e¢ cient workers living in the less productive region move toward the more
productive region by decreasing order of e¢ ciency. Thus, migration goes hand in hand
with workersproductivity, an empirically well-documented fact (Docquier and Rapoport,
2012). As a consequence, interregional income and welfare di¤erences reect di¤erences
in the geographical distribution of skills and human capital (Glaeser and Maré, 2001;
Combes et al., 2008; Moretti, 2011). Note that this process also a¤ects the unskilled: the
concentration of skilled brings about a welfare hike for the unskilled living in the same
region and a welfare drop for those who stay in the periphery.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model and
derive some preliminary results. In Section 3, we characterize the spatial equilibria and
study their stability. Section 4 shows how technological progress leads to the emergence
of a core-periphery structure, while Section 5 studies the concentration of human capital.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model and preliminary results
The economy is endowed with two regions, denoted r; s = 1; 2, a manufacturing (or
tradable service) sector producing a horizontally di¤erentiated good, one production factor
(labor), and a population of consumers of mass L. Workers are imperfectly mobile because
they bear a positive cost when they move from one region to the other.
The di¤erentiated good is made available under the form of a continuum n of varieties.
Consumers are endowed with one e¢ ciency unit of labor and share the same preferences.
The preferences of a consumer located in region r = 1; 2 are given by the CES utility:
Ur =
 X
s
Z ns
0
qsr(i)
 1
 di
!  1
; (1)
where ns is the number of varieties produced in region s = 1; 2, qsr(i) the consumption
of variety i produced in region s and consumed in region r, and  > 1 the elasticity of
substitution between any two varieties.
The budget constraint of a consumer located in region r is given byX
s
Z ns
0
psr(i)qsr(i)di = wr;
where psr(i) is the price of variety i produced in region s and consumed in r, while wr is
the wage rate in region r.
Labor markets are competitive and local, thus implying that wages need not be equal
between the two regions. The equilibrium wage in region r is determined by a bidding
process in which the region r-rms compete for workers by o¤ering them higher wages
until no rm earns strictly positive prots. Thus, a rms operating prots are equal to
its wage bill.
The individual demand in region r for variety i produced in region s is then as follows:
qsr(i) =
psr(i)
 
P 1 r
wr; (2)
where the price index Pr that prevails in region r is given by
Pr 
 X
s
Z ns
0
p1 sr (i)di
! 1
1 
: (3)
Firms operate under increasing returns and no scope economies. Thus, each rm
produces a single variety and each variety is produced by a single rm, so that ns is
also the number of rms set up in region s. The production of a variety needs a xed
requirement of f > 0 units of labor and a marginal requirement of c > 0 units of labor.
In this paper, technological progress means that f , c, or both fall. The technology is
identical in all locations - regions have no specic comparative advantage - and for all the
varieties - rms are symmetric. Hence, we may drop the variety-index i.
Following the new trade literature, we assume iceberg transport costs:  rs =  > 1
units of a variety have to be shipped from region r for one unit of that variety to be
available in region s 6= r, while transport costs are zero when a variety is sold in the
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region where it is produced ( rr =  ss = 1). Therefore, we have prr = pr and psr = ps.
If s denotes the share of consumers living in region s (with 1+2 = 1), for the demand
sLqrs in region s to be satised, each rm in region r must produce sLqrs units. The
prots earned by a rm located in region r are thus given by
r =prL
 X
s
s rsqrs
!
  wr
 
f + cL
X
s
s rsqrs
!
: (4)
Factorizing L in this expression shows that L plays the role of a scaling factor of f .
Therefore, without loss of generality, we may assume that L = 1. In this case, a lower
value of f is equivalent to a larger population size.
Given the individual demand (2), the prot-maximizing price is
pr =
c
   1wr: (5)
Assuming free entry and exit in the manufacturing sector, prots (4) are zero in
equilibrium:
(pr   cwr)
X
s
s rsqrs = wrf: (6)
Plugging (5) into (6) and solving for the total output qr = rqrr + sqrs yields
qr =
(   1)f
c
: (7)
Last, labor market balance in region r implies
nr
 
f + c
X
s
s rsqrs
!
= r: (8)
Using (7) and (8), we obtain:
nr =
r
f
: (9)
The balance condition of the product market yields the wage equation in region r:X
s
rsswsP
t tstw
1 
t
= wr ; (10)
where rs   1 rs 2 [0; 1). Choosing labor in region 2 as the numéraire, we have w1 = w
and w2 = 1. Setting 1    1=2 and 2  1   , for any given  the wage equation
(10) in the larger region may be rewritten as follows:
 =
w   
w   (w + 1)+ w1  ; (11)
where    1  2 [0; 1).4 The Walras law implies that trade between the two regions is
balanced.
4We show in the Appendix 1 that the denominator of (11) is positive.
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Observe, rst, that (11) implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
 and w. Therefore, w = 1 when  = 1=2 while w =  1= > 1 when  = 1. Note
the following di¤erence with Krugman: nominal wages are equal at the dispersed and
agglomerated congurations in the CP model; in our setting, the nominal wage is higher
in the larger region. Furthermore, as shown by Krugman (1980), the right hand side of
(11) increases in w, so that there exists a unique equilibrium wage w()  1 for any given
  1=2. Even though the labor and product markets are more competitive in region 1
than in region 2, the nominal wage is higher in the former. In addition, the nominal wage
prevailing in region 1 rises with the relative size  of this region. Consequently, since
prots are zero, the gross domestic product of the global economy rises monotonically
together with the degree of agglomeration.
What is more, the interregional wage gap widens when the two regions become more
asymmetric. Note, however, that the wage gap shrinks when  rises, that is, when the
two regions get more integrated. This is because the interregional di¤erence in prices
get smaller when  increases, which fosters the interregional convergence of wages. In
the limit, when the two markets are fully integrated ( = 1), the size di¤erence becomes
immaterial and there is wage equalization (w = 1).
Furthermore, using (3), (5) and (11) as well as the inequality w > 1, we get
P 1 1   P 1 2 = K
(w   1)w1 
w   (w + 1)+ w1  > 0;
where K is a positive constant. It then ensues from this expression that P1() < P2().
Thus, even though wages are higher in region 1 than in region 2, the price index in the
larger region is lower than that in the smaller one. Hence, consumers residing in the larger
region enjoy both higher wages and lower prices than those located in the smaller region.5
Moreover, although the natives and the migrants earn the same real wage in the larger
region, the former are better-o¤ than the latter who bear continued migration costs, as
mentioned by Collier (2013).
Since the indirect utility of an individual living in region r, which is equal to her real
wage, is given by
Vr() =
wr()
Pr()
; (12)
V1() exceeds V2() if and only if  > 1=2. LetV ()  V1() V2() be the interregional
utility di¤erential. Since d=dw > 0, we obtain
dV ()
d
=
@V ()
@
+
+
@V ()
@w
+
dw
d
+
> 0; (13)
which means that the utility di¤erential increases with the size of the larger region. In
other words, the incentive to move from region 2 to region 1 gets stronger as the larger
region grows in size. It is worth stressing, however, that this incentive weakens as the
5This result might come as a surprise to the reader because larger cities are often places where the
cost of living is higher. To a large extent, this is because housing and some nontradables are much more
expensive in large cities than in small ones (Suedekum, 2006). Housing and nontradables are absent
in our model because the focus is on regions, not on cities. However, introducing commuting and land
consumption put a break on the agglomeration process without a¤ecting the nature of our main results.
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two regional markets get more integrated, the reason being that the economic di¤erences
between regions fade away.
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume any given distribution of rms and consumers such that  > 1=2.
Then, the real wage in the larger region exceeds that in the smaller region. Furthermore,
the interregional gap widens when regions become more asymmetric.
Even though the productivity of labor is the same in the two regions, the di¤erence
in market size is su¢ cient to explain why rms located in the larger region can pay a
higher wage to their workers, a result supported by robust empirical evidence (Head and
Mayer, 2011; Redding, 2011). Furthermore, since more varieties are produced in the
larger region, the corresponding price index is lower, which also agrees with the empirical
evidence provided by Handbury and Weinstein (2013) who observe that price level for
food products falls with city size. Therefore, migration ows (if any) are unidirectional:
consumers move from the smaller to the larger region but never from the larger to the
smaller region.
Note that the above proposition implies that, in the absence of migration costs, all
consumers migrate to the larger region. In other words, there is always agglomeration
in a single region. This highlights the role of migration costs in the process shaping the
space-economy.
3 Spatial equilibrium with homogeneous labor
Because the equilibrium wage w is uniquely determined by the wage equation (11), the
interregional utility di¤erential can be expressed as a function of :
V () =
   1
cf
1
 1

 1
h
w
 
  + w1  1 1    1  + w1  1 1 i : (14)
The decision made by a consumer to migrate relies on the utility di¤erential V ()
and the migration cost she bears when moving. As argued in the introduction, moving
from one region to the other involves various psychological adjustments that adversely
a¤ect a migrant.
Migration cost is not a one-time expense: if consumers move to the other region, they
incur a permanent cost to adjust to their new place. As a result, some people will stay
put even when they may guarantee to themselves higher living standards in other places.
Migration costs thus have the nature of a dislocation cost, which vanishes if consumers
return to their place of origin or is equal to zero if they stay put. Such a cost is usually
consumer-specic, which implies that di¤erent consumers bear di¤erent migration costs
m() > 0, where m increases with . Therefore, measuring m() in utility terms, the
-consumers choose to stay put if
jV ()j  m(); (15)
where the indirect utility di¤erential is the same across all consumers whereas migration
costs vary with consumerstype. In Section 5 we assume that workers are heterogeneous
in their individual productivity. The analysis developed therein can be repeated mutatis
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mutandis to show that consumers living in the smaller region move toward the larger
region by increasing order of migration costs. Therefore, in region 2, as  rises migrants
enjoy a decreasing utility level; only the marginal migrant has the same net utility level
in both regions. For simplicity, we assume that migrants bear the same migration cost:
m() = m > 0. Note also that a growing number of migrants often lower migration costs
through network e¤ects that reduce information asymmetries (see, e.g. Munshi, 2003).
In this case, m is a decreasing function of . Accounting for such an e¤ect weakens the
dispersion force and makes our point stronger.
The expression (14) reveals the striking di¤erence between a fall in c and a fall in
 : for a given value of , the utility di¤erential V () rises when c decreases whereas
V () falls when  decreases, thus changing the nature of migration incentives. This
is because market integration makes the two regions more similar in terms of prices and
wages, whereas a rising labor productivity that equally a¤ects both regions exacerbates
existing regional disparities.
A consumer distribution  2 [0; 1] is a spatial equilibrium if no consumer has an
incentive to migrate away from the region where they are located: jV ()j  m. At
such an equilibrium, consumers enjoy a level of well-being that varies with the region in
which they reside, but the welfare gap is bounded above by m.
Since V () increases with  and V (1=2) = 0, the equation V () = m has at
most one solution  > 1=2, which increases with m. The function V () being point
symmetric, V (1=2 + x) =  V (1=2   x), 1    is the solution to V () =  m.
If jV ()j = m has no solution in (1=2; 1), then migration costs are so high that no
distribution exists that yields a positive utility gain net of migration costs. In other
words, migration costs are large enough for any distribution to be a spatial equilibrium.
From now on, we rule out this case by assuming that
   1
cf
1
 1

 1
> m
for the equation V () = m to have a solution in (1=2; 1).
Two types of equilibria may arise. In the rst one,  2 [1   ; ] so that rms and
activities are partially dispersed. In this case, no consumers migrate because the utility
gains do not exceed their mobility cost, thus implying that any  2 [1  ; ] is a spatial
equilibrium. The second type of equilibrium involves the agglomeration of activities in
a single region:  = 0; 1. When  = 0, we get w = 1=, and thus V < 0; when
 = 1, we get w =  1=, and thus V > 0. In either case, regardless of the values of
the parameters of the economy no migration occurs. The reason for this is the absence
of immobile farmers, who otherwise lead rms and consumers to leave the cluster when
transport costs are high.
3.1 The set of stable spatial equilibria
When several equilibria exist, it is commonplace to use some stability concept to dis-
criminate between the di¤erent equilibria. This requires the use of a specic adjustment
process. In what follows, we use the myopic evolutionary dynamics of NEG:

 =
8<:
(1  )(V () +m) for 0   < 1  
0 for 1      
(1  )(V () m) for  <   1:
(16)
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Of course, a spatial equilibrium is a steady-state of (16). Since the utility di¤erential
V () must exceed m for  > 1=2 to increase, consumers stay put when the economic
gains stemming from migrating are not su¢ ciently large to o¤set their own migration
costs.
Ideally, migration generating continued costs should be studied in a dynamic frame-
work where consumers maximizes the intertemporal value of their utility ows net of the
various costs that negatively a¤ect migrants at each period of their lifetime. Rather,
we have chosen to use the same static setting as Krugman (1991) for the following two
reasons. First, the static approach makes the analysis much simpler and facilitates the
interpretation of the results. Second, when consumers have a low mobility, (16) may be
considered as a good approximation of a model involving a forward-looking dynamics
(Oyama, 2009). Since we focus on the impact of signicant migration costs, we nd it
reasonable to believe the static approach to pin down the rst-order results. By adding
m to (16), we capture the idea that a consumer who moves from, say, region 2 to region 1
enjoys a permanent utility ow given by V1() > V2() and bears a continued cost equal
to m.
The spatial equilibrium  is said to be (asymptotically) stable when the adjustment
process (16) leads the o¤-equilibrium consumers back to . The existence of positive
migration costs implies that any distribution belonging to the interval (1   ; ) are
stable spatial equilibria because this interval is an open set. In other words, migration
costs stabilizes a wide range of distributions of activities. Asm falls, the interval (1 ; )
narrows down; it is empty for m = 0 because  = 1=2. When the equality holds in (15),
there exist two other equilibria given by  = 1   ; . However, both are unstable as
shown by computing the derivative of the utility di¤erential (13).6 Last, since V < 0 at
 = 0 while V > 0 at  = 1, these two congurations are also stable equilibria.
To sum up, we present the next proposition.
Proposition 2 In the presence of migration costs, there exists a continuum of stable
equilibria given by (1  ; ) and  = 0; 1.
Note the di¤erence with the standard core-periphery (CP) model where the number
of equilibria is nite while the only stable equilibria involve full dispersion or full agglom-
eration (Krugman, 1991; Robert-Nicoud, 2005). This is because migration costs act as a
stabilizing force whose intensity is una¤ected by the geographical distribution of activi-
ties. For example, the symmetric and agglomerated congurations on which NEG focuses
are always stable equilibria here, thus destroying the main prediction of NEG saying that
dispersion (agglomeration) prevails when transport costs are high (low).
Whereas the value 0 > 1=2 has no impact on the nal outcome in standard NEG
models, 0 now matters because the continued migration costs are borne only when con-
sumers reside outside their place of origin. Indeed, given that V () > 0 for any  > 1=2,
two cases may arise. (i) If V (0)  m, no consumer migrates. Hence,  = 0 is a stable
spatial equilibrium. (ii) If V (0) > m, some consumers migrate from region 2 to region
1. Since V () rises with , V () increases when more consumers move to region 1.
As a result, the inequality V () > m is never reverse. In this event,  = 1 is a stable
spatial equilibrium. In sum, for any given   1 there exists a unique spatial equilibrium
() given by 0 or 1.
6These two equilibria correspond the two asymmetric interior equilibria identied by Krugman (1991),
which are unstable.
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3.2 Do transport costs matter?
In the presence of multiple stable equilibria, it is hard to predict which equilibrium
emerges. A common way out is to start from an arbitrary initial equilibrium 0 2 (1 ; )
and to study its evolutionary path by changing steadily a key-parameter of the model.
The standard thought experiment of NEG focuses on the impact of falling transport costs
on the distribution of the manufacturing sector. In what follows, we thus assume that the
economy starts with su¢ ciently high values of  and study how the initial distribution
0  1=2 reacts to steady decreases in  .
When  = 1, V () = 0 regardless of the value of . Therefore, by continuity,  > 1
exists such that V < m for any  and all 1 <  <  . In other words, when transport
costs are very low, the set of stable spatial equilibria encompasses the unit interval. But
what happens when  exceeds ? To answer this question, we have to nd how  varies
with  .
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the equilibrium distributions and the level of
transport costs. The interior of the shaded domain describes the continuum of dispersed
equilibria satisfying (15), while the two bold horizontal lines describe the two agglomerated
equilibria. As shown in the Appendix, () increases when  falls provided that  
  1 + 1=p2  1:71.7 Since the empirical estimates of  are all much larger than
 (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004), we may assume without much loss of generality
that this condition holds. In this case, the interval (1   ; ) expands as  decreases.
As a consequence, when the initial distribution 0 belongs to (1   ; ) for some ^ , this
distribution remains a stable equilibrium for all  < ^ . That is, when 1=2 < 0 < , there
exists a unique spatial equilibrium given by () = 0 for all   1; see the dashed arrow
in Figure 1. This is very di¤erent from the main nding of NEG where a steady decrease
in  always moves the economy from dispersion to agglomeration (Krugman, 1991; Fujita
et al., 1999).
Insert Figure 1 about here
The reason for this change in results may be explained as follows. Because di¤erences
between the interregional price and the wage gaps shrink when transport costs fall, the
larger region becomes relatively less attractive. As a consequence, if the initial utility
di¤erential is not large enough to trigger consumersmigration, this holds true even more
so when transport costs are lower because the cost-of-living di¤erence has decreased. In
addition, as illustrated by the shaded area of Figure 1, smaller transport costs allow sus-
taining a larger domain of spatial equilibria. In the limit, as said above, when  gets close
to 1, the domain of spatial equilibria often encompasses the unit interval, which implies
that any initial distribution of activities is a spatial equilibrium. To put it di¤erently,
when transport costs are positive but low enough, location no longer matters provided
that the initial distribution is not too unbalanced. In sum, since Proposition 1 implies that
no migration from the larger to the smaller region occurs, there is no force incentivizing
consumers to migrate. Thus, contrary to the main prediction of NEG, we may conclude
that the integration of regional markets does not necessarily spark the agglomeration of
the manufacturing sector.
7If  < ,  rst decreases and then increases with falling transport costs. In this case, 0 ceases to
be a stable equilibrium at the rst value of  such that  = (): The equilibrium is then given by  = 1
for lower transport costs.
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By contrast, if 0 belongs to the upper (lower) non-shaded domain of Figure 1 while
transport costs are high, the initial distribution is not a spatial equilibrium. If 0 > 1=2,
Proposition 1 implies that the spatial equilibrium is unique and given by  = 1. Indeed,
owing to its size advantage, region 1 produces a much wider range of varieties than region
2, while high transport costs make these varieties much more expensive in region 2 than
in region 1. As a consequence, the cost-of-living di¤erence is large enough to trigger the
relocation of consumers from region 2 to region 1. In this event, the larger region can be
viewed as a black holethat accommodates the entire manufacturing sector (Fujita et
al., 1999).
This is not the end of the story, however. Since
sgn
@V (1)
@
= sgn
@
@

1   2 1( 1)

< 0
a falling  makes V (1) smaller and smaller. The continued dislocation cost that con-
sumers bear when they do not live in their place of origin vanishes when they go back
to their place of origin. Therefore, when V (1) becomes smaller than m, those who had
chosen to migrate from 2 to 1 return to their place of origin. That is, when 0 exceeds ,
 exists such that () = 1 for  >  and () = 0 for  <  ; see the solid arrows in
Figure 1. In other words, by reducing interregional economic di¤erences, market integra-
tion gives rise to return migrations. Note that, after their second move, those consumers
enjoy a utility level V2(0) lower than V1(0) because region 1 is bigger. Nevertheless, they
prefer to move back to their place of origin because this allows them to avoid incurring
the dislocation cost m, which now exceeds the value of V (0) because for  <  . As a
consequence, the larger region ceases to be a black hole.
All those results clash with what NEG tells us. Yet they are both intuitive and
plausible. The foregoing discussion also shows that, in our setting, history matters in a
deeper way than in standard NEG models.
4 The impact of rising labor productivity
In this section, we turn our attention to the e¤ect of a rising labor productivity and show
that, regardless of its concrete form, a steadily increase in labor productivity brings about
the agglomeration of the manufacturing sector. To avoid undue complexity, we assume
that productivity gains stem from exogenous technological progress. Although both c and
f are likely to be a¤ected by technological progress, we will see that falling marginal and
xed requirements of labor do not have the same implications for consumers.
4.1 Marginal labor requirement
We consider a new thought experiment and show that a steady decrease in the marginal
labor requirement c has an impact that greatly di¤ers from that generated by falling
transport costs, which is described in Proposition 2. Figure 2, very much like Figure 1,
shows how the geographical distribution of economic activities and the marginal labor
requirement are related. Observe that Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the di¤erence in the
impacts of a deeper market integration and a higher labor productivity:  decreases with
 but increases with c.
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Let 0 be the initial distribution of economic activities. Since V () decreases with
c, the equation V (0) =  V (1   0) = m has a unique solution c0. The shaded
domain describes the continuum of dispersed equilibria associated with any c exceeding
c0. Note that the vertical distance between these two curves now increases with the
marginal requirement c. Indeed, since @V=@c < 0,  decreases when c falls. Since the
spatial equilibria arising under 0 2 [0; 1=2) are the mirror images of those arising under
0 2 (1=2; 1], we assume without loss of generality that region 1 accommodates a priori a
larger number of rms and consumers than region 2: 0 2 (1=2; 1].
Insert Figure 2 about here
Suppose that the economy starts from a su¢ ciently high marginal production cost,
which gradually decreases. Because c is arbitrarily large, it is readily veried that any
distribution  2 [1=2; ] is a stable equilibrium. In addition,  = 1 is always a stable
equilibrium. From now on, we rule out the extreme cases where the initial distribution
0 = 1=2 or 1 and assume that 0 2 (1=2; ). Then,  = 0 is a stable spatial equilibrium
for all c 2 (c0;1). Or, to put it di¤erently, as long as c exceeds the threshold c0, a rising
labor productivity has no impact on the geographical distribution of the manufacturing
sector.
However, as shown in subsection 3.1, once c is equal to c0 the equilibrium 
 = 
becomes unstable. Furthermore, the interval of partially dispersed equilibria [1   ; ]
shrinks as c decreases and is empty for c < c0. Therefore, 
 = 0 ceases to be a spatial
equilibrium for c smaller than c0. In this case, the new stable equilibrium is given by
 = 1 for all c 2 (0; c0); see the solid arrows in Figure 2. Evidently, lowering m implies
a hike in c0, and thus a faster concentration of rms and jobs in region 1.
The following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 3 Assume that the marginal labor requirement falls steadily. Then, for any
initial distribution of activities 0 2 (1=2; ), there exists a threshold c0 such that (i) 0
is a stable spatial equilibrium for all c > c0; and (ii) 
 = 1 is the unique stable spatial
equilibrium for all c  c0.
This is reminiscent of Krugmans (1991) CP model: the evolutionary process involves,
rst, the (partial) dispersion of activities for a whole domain of values taken by the
parameters  (Krugman) or c (here) and, then, the agglomeration of rms and workers in
one region. Technological change is a slow process that displays strong inertia over time,
and this inertia also characterizes the geographical dimension of change.
The reasons for Proposition 3 are easy to grasp. When c falls, the following three
e¤ects are at work. First, because 0 exceeds 1=2, it ensues from Proposition 1 that the
nominal wage is higher in region 1 than in region 2. As long as  = 0, (11) implies that
a decreasing marginal labor requirement does not a¤ect the equilibrium wage w. By
contrast, when  starts rising above 0, (11) shows that the nominal wage in region 1 also
rises. Second, when  = 0, (5) shows that a fall in c translates into a lower equilibrium
price for the existing varieties, regardless of where they are produced. However, when 
starts rising above 0, the wage paid in region 1 also increases, which may result in a
price hike in region 1. Since p1=w
 = c=(   1), a falling c lowers p1=w, thus implying
that w rises faster than the equilibrium price p1.
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Third, and last, the productivity hike implies that fewer workers are needed to produce
the existing varieties. Although the equilibrium output qr increases with falling c from (7),
every rm hires the same number of workers to produce a larger output because cqr + f
is independent of c. By implication, the total number of varieties remains the same (see
also (9)). As a consequence, when c falls, 1=P 1   1=P 2 rises, and thus the indirect utility
di¤erential V (0) increases. As long as V (0) remains smaller than the migration cost
m, no region 2s consumer moves ( = 0), but all consumers are better o¤ because of the
price drop and the production hike. Note that the number of varieties remains the same.
Once c falls below the threshold c0, V (0) exceeds the migration cost m and a
few consumers living in the smaller region move to the larger one. As a consequence,
more (fewer) varieties are produced in region 1 (2). Since w rises faster than p1, w

1=P

1
increases at a higher rate than 1=P 2 . Therefore, the di¤erenceV () V (0) gets bigger
when c falls. Thus, as in Krugman (1991), the interplay between these various e¤ects
generates the cumulative causation that feeds the migration process until all consumers
are agglomerated in region 1, and so even when c < c0 has stopped decreasing. Unlike
the case of falling  in subsection 3.2, consumers migrate at most once because V () is
decreasing in c whereas it is increasing in  .
It is legitimate to ask what Proposition 3 becomes in Krugmans original CP model
which, unlike ours, involves a farming sector. Because the CP model is not easy to handle
analytically, we have undertaken this using the linear model of monopolistic competition
(Ottaviano et al., 2002). If the number of farmers is not too high (otherwise there is always
dispersion) and not too low (otherwise there is always agglomeration), the economy shifts
from dispersion to agglomeration when labor productivity has reached a certain threshold.
Therefore, disregarding the farming sector is not the reason for our main results. Similarly,
accounting for housing and commuting costs, which both rise with  in region 1 and fall in
region 2, decreases the utility level in the larger region and increases it in the smaller one,
thereby lowering the utility di¤erential V (). Nevertheless, a fall in c still drives the
geographical concentration of the manufacturing sector because @V=@c > 0 still holds.
When that dispersion force is grafted onto our setting, it is natural to expect the economy
to involve partial, rather than full, agglomeration of the manufacturing sector.
4.2 Fixed labor requirement
Consider now a fall in the xed requirement of labor. As shown by (5), the price of existing
varieties is una¤ected. Even though a rms output qr increases with falling f , the number
of rms and varieties in each region increases from (9). In other words, the productivity
hike implies that some workers are freed from producing the existing varieties. Since
their number is greater in region 1 than in region 2, a larger number of new varieties are
launched in region 1 than in region 2, which implies that 1=P 1   1=P 2 increases with
falling f . In this case, the total number of varieties produced in the economy increases,
but it does so more in region 1 than in region 2.
Because V (0) is decreasing in f , the equation V (0) = m has a single solution,
which is denoted f0. Applying the argument used to prove Proposition 3, we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 4 Assume that the xed labor requirement falls steadily. Then, for any
initial distribution of activities 0 2 (1=2; ), there exists a threshold f0 such that (i) 0
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is a stable spatial equilibrium for all f > f0; and (ii) 
 = 1 is the unique stable spatial
equilibrium for all f  f0.
A drop in c leads to a higher total output Q = nqr = (   1)=c through a big-
ger output per rm, whereas n = 1=f does not change. On the other hand, a fall in
f increases the number of rms and varieties, n = 1=f but does not a¤ect Q. Thus,
although falling marginal and xed labor requirements are not congruent in terms of their
e¤ects on the economy, the above two propositions have a clear implication: a steady ow
of labor-saving innovations brings about a transition from a (partially) dispersed cong-
uration of activities to an agglomerated one. Hence, when we disregard the problematic
existence of immobile farmers whose role is to hold back industrial workers living in the
less prosperous region in Krugmans setting, the e¤ects of a rising labor productivity are
in sharp contrast to those generated by falling transport costs. More precisely, a growing
labor productivity widens the interregional utility di¤erential, which eventually outweighs
migration costs and generates interregional migration. In contrast, steady drops in trans-
port costs reduce the interregional utility di¤erential and keep the distribution of activities
una¤ected.
The following remarks are in order. First, very much like in NEG, the initial distri-
bution of activities displays some sluggishness during the rst phases of technological
progress, but then abruptly takes the form of a large economic agglomeration of rms and
consumers. Second, like in NEG again, a small initial inequality in the spatial distribution
of activities can lead to a large and striking inequality at equilibrium.
Last, industrialization and urbanization are also fed by large rural-urban migrations.
Although our model does not account for an agricultural sector, we may capture the
impact of such migrations by studying how the space-economy changes when the labor
force L rises. We have seen that an increase in L amounts to a decrease in f . Therefore, it
follows from Proposition 4 that the manufacturing sector gets more agglomerated when the
population working in this sector grows. In other words, stronger rural-urban migrations
exacerbate the tendency toward the agglomeration of activities.
5 Spatial equilibrium with heterogeneous labor
So far, we have assumed that all workers bear the same migration cost. What is more,
the assumption of equally productive workers is a very strong one. In this section, we
assume that an e-type worker is endowed with e > 0 e¢ ciency units of labor and bears a
migration cost m(e) > 0. Workers are thus heterogeneous along two dimensions, that is,
migration cost and productivity. It is empirically well documented that skilled workers are
more mobile than unskilled workers (OECD, 2005, Chart 2.10), which means that m is a
decreasing function of e. Since the two types of heterogeneity are highly correlated, we may
avoid the technicalities associated with two-dimensional heterogeneity by assuming that
workers are heterogeneous along their productivity type only. Assuming that m decreases
with the skill level strengthens the results obtained in this section. More generally, our
analysis holds true when (i) consumers can be ranked according to a one-dimensional type
 that embodies di¤erent forms of heterogeneity across individuals (e.g., productivity,
mobility, taste for natural amenities) and (ii) the indirect utility of a type -consumer
residing in region r is given by Vr() = A()wr=Pr, where A() is a monotone function of
.
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Let the total number of e¢ ciency units of labor available in the two regions be equal to
1 after normalization. When labor is heterogeneous, what determines the productive size
of region r is no longer the number of workers r residing in this region, but the number
of e¢ ciency units of labor Er available therein. In other words, r is to be replaced by
Er in the analysis developed above. Observe that what matters in our model is the value
of Er, not the composition of the group of workers residing in region r.
Individual types are initially distributed in region r = 1; 2 according to the continuous
density function gr(e) > 0 dened over (0;1). The corresponding regional labor supply
functions are then given by
E  E1 =
Z 1
0
eg1 (e) de E2 = 1  E 
Z 1
0
eg2 (e) de: (17)
Since a region endowed with a given number of e¢ ciency units of labor is equivalent to
a region endowed with the same number of workers having the same productivity, region
1 is said to be more productive than region 2 if the total number of e¢ ciency units of
labor available in the former exceeds that in the latter, that is, E1 > E2 or, equivalently,
E > 1=2. Assuming E > 1=2 does not imply that region 1 has a larger population than
region 2 because a higher number of ine¢ cient workers may be located in region 2 than
in region 1. Since c and f are now expressed in e¢ ciency units of labor, labor market
clearing implies Er = fnr for r = 1; 2, so that region 1 accommodates a higher number
of rms than region 2.
Denoting by wr the price of one e¢ ciency unit of labor in region r, the income of an
e-type worker residing in region r is equal to ewr. Therefore, her indirect utility is given
by
Vr(e) = e
wr
Pr
; (18)
which increases linearly with e.
Both the equilibrium wages wr and price indices Pr depend on E as they depend on 
in Section 2. Accordingly, for any initial distribution E > 1=2, we can call on Proposition
1 to assert that w1 > w

2 and P

1 < P

2 . While e varies across types of labor, the variables
wr and P

r are common to all workers residing in region r. Thus, the interregional utility
di¤erential is given by
V (e; E) = V1(e; E)  V2(e; E) = e

w1(E)
P 1 (E)
  1
P 2 (E)

; (19)
which is positive and increasing in e.
Since V (e; E) becomes arbitrarily large for su¢ ciently high values of e, the utility
di¤erential of the workers endowed with a large number of e¢ ciency units of labor always
exceeds their migration cost. As a consequence, region 2s most productive workers choose
to migrate to region 1. But how many workers in region 2 want to migrate?
Let e 2 (0;1) be the marginal e-type workers indi¤erent between moving to the
more productive region and staying put in the less productive one. Thus, the equilibrium
number of e¢ ciency units of labor available in the larger region is given by
E(e) =
Z 1
0
eg1 (e) de+
Z 1
e
eg2 (e) de; (20)
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while the equilibrium number of workers residing in region 1 is given byZ 1
0
g1 (e) de+
Z 1
e
g2 (e) de;
where the rst term is the initial number 0 of workers and the second the number of
migrants.
As in Section 2, we choose the e¢ ciency unit of labor in region 2 as the numéraire, so
that w1 = w and w2 = 1. The wage equation (11) then becomes
E (e)
1  E(e) =
w 1 (w   )
1  w : (21)
Clearly, the left-hand side of this expression decreases with e, whereas the right-hand
side increases with w. The implicit function theorem thus implies that (21) has a unique
solution w(e) while w0(e) < 0 for all e 2 (0;1). As a consequence, when the number
of migrants moving into region 1 increases, the price of one e¢ ciency unit of labor in this
region also increases.
The expressions (20) and (21) imply that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
e and E as well as between e and wr=Pr. As a consequence, the utility di¤erential may
be rewritten as a function of e only. An interior equilibrium e is then determined by the
solution to the spatial equilibrium condition:
V (e) = e

w1(E(e))
P 1 (E(e))
  1
P 2 (E(e))

= m: (22)
Unlike (19), both the wages and price indices in (22) now depend upon e only. Set
h(e)  V (e) m: (23)
We have h(0) =  m < 0 and h(1) = 1 > 0. Hence, there exists an equilibrium e = e
where h0(e) > 0. This inequality implies that e is stable because e decreases with E.
We can repeat the analysis of Section 4 and show that the equilibrium price w of one
e¢ ciency unit of labor rises when c decreases. Similarly, the inverse price index di¤erence
1=P 1   1=P 2 increases when c falls. As a consequence, V increases when c decreases.
In other words, h(e) is shifted upward, which implies that e decreases when c falls. Note
that the decrease in e is not necessarily continuous. Indeed, if there are multiple stable
equilibria, some of them may disappear when c falls. In this case, the economy jumps
to another stable equilibrium having a larger number of workers in region 1 because this
region is more attractive. However, if there is a unique stable equilibrium, e gradually
decreases when c steadily decreases.
Falling xed requirements f yield the same qualitative result. Thus, we have the
following result.
Proposition 5 Assume that E > 1=2. If the marginal or xed labor requirement steadily
decreases, the number of individuals residing in region 1 monotonically increases by at-
tracting workers whose productive e¢ ciency decreases.
This proposition provides a rationale for the well-documented fact that the skilled
workers (e > e) living in a less e¢ cient place tends to move toward a more e¢ cient place.
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Specically, region 1 accommodates a more than proportionated share of skilled workers,
which echoes Behrens et al. (2014) and Eeckhout et al. (2014). Through the migration
of such workers, the economy ends up with one prosperous region, while the other is
relatively poorer. It thus seems fair to say that Proposition 5 highlights a fundamental
trend of the contemporary space-economy, which supplements other sorting mechanisms
that have been studied in NEG and urban economics (Mori and Turrini, 2005; Eeckhout
et al., 2014).
Empirical evidence also suggests that large and prosperous cities are characterized by
a growing skill and income polarization of their population (Berry and Glaeser, 2005). In
our setting, this can be explained by the fact that the core region hosts both skilled and
unskilled workers, i.e., the skilled from regions 1 and 2 as well as the unskilled (e < e)
from region 1. Whether region 1 features a more than disproportionate share of unskilled
workers (e < e), as in Behrens et al. (2014) and Eeckhout et al. (2014), depends on
the initial distribution of such workers between regions. That no sharp conclusion can be
derived from our setting suggests that the initial conditions matter a lot for the equilibrium
outcome. In addition, it should be kept in mind that migrants enjoy di¤erent welfare levels
because they are heterogeneous, thereby making some comparisons especially di¢ cult.
If the per capita income decreases in region 2, the impact of migration on the per capita
income in region 1 depends on the position of the migrants on this regions skill ladder.
Note also that the more productive region need not be the larger one since E > 1=2 can
be consistent with  < 1=2. In this respect, di¤erent economic landscapes may emerge,
depending on the densities gr.
Observe that the problem studied above has the nature of an assignment problem with
heterogeneous workers (Sattinger, 1993). However, it has two distinctive features. First,
each worker is initially assigned to a specic location and, second, when moving away
from her initial location, this worker incurs a positive dislocation cost. Since w(E) and
P 2 (E) increase with E while P

1 (E) decreases with E, it follows from (19) that
@2V (e; E)
@e@E
> 0; (24)
which means that our setting satises the supermodularity property. Note that, unlike
many authors, we do not assume that our setting is supermodular. Rather, we show that,
owing to (admittedly simple) general equilibrium e¤ects, our setting is supermodular.8
This property has two far-reaching implications. First, by raising the price of an
e¢ cient unit of labor, the migration of the more productive workers pulls up the less pro-
ductive workers residing in the core region. Specically, the unskilled born in region 1
enjoy higher nominal wages than their counterparts who live in region 2. For example,
considering the 25 bottom percent of job earnings in 2013 Japan, we nd that the corre-
sponding workers living in the core regions of Japan (the 10 prefectures containing Tokyo,
Osaka and Nagoya) earn 23 per cent more than their counterpart residing in the rest of
the country. Thus, like in Moretti (2010), the unskilled benet from the creation of skilled
jobs in their region. However, in Moretti this e¤ect is channelized through the creation
of jobs for the unskilled, whereas it manifests here through higher wages. The reason for
this di¤erence lies in the assumption of full employment made in this paper.
To this income e¤ect, we must add the standard e¤ect that stems from a broader
range of varieties produced in the core region, which increases even further the welfare of
8Davis and Dingel (2013) derive the same property in a related, but di¤erent, context.
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the unskilled residing in this region. On the other hand, this e¤ect decreases the welfare
of those who stay put in the poor region. Hence, when it is recognized that workers are
heterogeneous, migration a¤ects all workers, regardless of their productivity. Therefore,
the wage hike paid to the unskilled is not a compensation for a higher cost-of-living as in
Suedekum (2006) because the price index of region 1 decreases when more skilled workers
settle down therein.
Second, (24) implies that there is perfect spatial sorting of workers across types be-
longing to (e;1). In contrast, workers sharing the same types e < e are not located in
the same region. Therefore, spatial sorting across all types is imperfect.
6 Conclusion
The central tenet that cuts across NEG is that falling transport costs explain the ag-
glomeration of economic activities. In this paper, we propose a di¤erent explanation: the
emergence of a core-periphery structure stems from technological progress in the manufac-
turing sector. Given the dramatic labor productivity growth observed ever since the be-
ginning of the Industrial Revolution, we nd this explanation both plausible and relevant.
Therefore, the prime mover responsible for the emergence of a core-periphery structure
would be technological innovations in the manufacturing sector rather than technological
innovations in the transportation sector. In other words, rising labor productivity takes
the place of falling transport costs as the main explanation for the emergence and per-
sistence of an uneven distribution of activities across space. These results are proven by
using a paper-and-pencil method that is disarmingly simple, whereas standard NEG mod-
els often appeal to numerical simulations. This has allowed us (i) to study in a detailed
way the various e¤ects at work and (ii) to take on board di¤erent types of asymmetry
and/or heterogeneity, something which is not easy accomplish in models à la Krugman
(Baldwin et al., 2003).
That said, we would be the last to claim that market integration does not play any
role. Quite the opposite, we believe that market integration has been, and still is, one
of the main drivers shaping the space-economy. For example, it is well documented that
the commercial revolution in the 17th century, which has been facilitated by a large
number of improvements in transportation techniques, went with the relocation of textile
production. Likewise, larger and integrated markets make R&D more protable and lead
to more inventions. To a large extent, explaining the geographical pattern of production
in various countries requires combining technological progress and market integration.
In contrast, we do not believe that the existence of the primary sector and other ac-
tivities using immobile inputs is su¢ cient to explain the existence of (partially) dispersed
patterns of activities in modern economies. Rather, we recognize that migration is gov-
erned by push and pull e¤ects in which signicant and continued migration costs plays
the role of a dispersion force. Note that the existence of high commuting costs and land
prices in the core region may hold back the agglomeration process, thereby implying that
some manufacturing activities are located in the periphery.
We have shown that, once labor productivity has increased su¢ ciently, the interplay
between the agglomeration and dispersion forces triggers the (partial) concentration of
activities. However, there is no reason to expect the resulting pattern of activities to prevail
forever. Indeed, we have assumed in the foregoing sections that technological progress
19
a¤ected all regions equally. It is reasonable, however, to believe that labor requirement
declines at di¤erent rates in various regions. In this case, even when region 1 is the core
of the economy, a reversal of fortune becomes possible if region 2 experiences a stronger
wave of innovations. In this event, the peripheral region or country is able to throw o¤
its history. Such a redrawing of the map of economic activities is di¢ cult to obtain in
standard NEG models.
Our model, owing to its extreme exibility, can be extended in several directions. First,
it is well known that technological progress follows di¤erent trajectories across industries.
Therefore, our approach allows to explain why di¤erent industries display contrasted
location patterns. Second, for our main results to hold, we need only the following two
intuitive conditions: dV=d > 0 and @V=@c < 0, which hold in alternative preferences
settings, such as those involving quadratic preferences or additive utilities.
Third, the model could also be extended to account for the internal functioning of
regions, which do not often grow at the same pace. This could be done by introducing
di¤erent microeconomic mechanisms that generate agglomeration (dis)economies, such as
those analyzed by Duranton and Puga (2004). In such a context, it would be natural to
focus on endogenous technological progress, which is often place-specic, and to add a
housing sector to the model. Hopefully, such a microscopic extension of our macroscopic
model would nd out why some regions fare better than others.
Last, our setting could be used as a building block in a model of endogenous regional
growth model. We expect such a model to predict a growing divergence between regions.
This does not mean, however, that smaller regions or countries are doomed to lag behind
forever. These regions may take leverage on their high degree of political homogeneity to
react faster than larger regions or countries to new opportunities.
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Appendix
We show that d()=d < 0 or, equivalently, d()=d > 0 over (0; 1) for all   . The
variable () 2 (1=2; 1] must satisfy the following two equilibrium conditions:
F1 (;w)  w    

w   (w + 1)+ w1  = 0 (25)
F2 (;w)  V () m = 0: (26)
It is readily veried from comparative statics that
d
d
=
 @F1(;w)
@
@F2(;w)
@w
+ @F2(;w)
@
@F1(;w)
@w
@F1(;w)
@
@F2(;w)
@w
  @F1(;w)
@w
@F2(;w)
@
(27)
where  and w solve (25) and (26).
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The denominator of (27) is negative from (13). Plugging (11) into the numerator of
(27), we get
G (W )  G1 (W ) [G2 (W ) G3 (W )]
where W  w 2 (1; 1=] while
G1 (W )  (1  
2)
2 
 1W
2 +1
( 1)
cf
1
 1

 1
h
W (W   ) +W 1 (1  W )
i 
 1
> 0
G2 (W )  W
2 1
( 1) (1  W ) 2   1  2   2 (   1)W  > 0
G3 (W )  (W   )
 
2   1  2W   2 (   1) > 0:
Thus, G (W ) is positive if and only if G2 (W )   G3 (W ) > 0. Since G2 and G3 are
positive, the sign of G2 (W ) G3 (W ) is the same as the sign of
G4 (W )  logG2 (W )  logG3 (W ) :
Di¤erentiating this expression yields
G04 (W ) = G5 (W )G6 (W )
where
G5 (W )  2   1
 (   1)W 
2 3+1
( 1) G2(W )G3(W )
is positive, while
G6 (W )  2(   1)2(2   1  2)W 4 + (4   3  2)

2   3 + 1  (2 +    3)2W 3
  43   102 + 6   1  (2   1) (10   11)2   (43   62   10 + 11)4   6W 2
+(4   3  2) 2   3 + 1  (2 +    3)2W + 22(   1)(2   1  2)
is negative as shown by studying the derivatives of this function.
(i) Since G00006 (W )  0, G0006 (W ) is increasing over (1;  1].
(ii) We have
G0006 (
 1) = 6
 
1  2 43 + 2   11 + 5   2 +    32
 6  1  2 43 + 2   11 + 5   2 +    3
= 24
 
1  2 (   1)2 ( + 2)
 0
where the rst inequality holds because 2 +    3 > 0 for all   .
(iii) We have
G006
 
 1

= 2
 
1  2 83   112   3 + 4   43   32   7 + 32   4
 2  1  2 83   112   3 + 4   43   32   7 + 3  1
= 8
 
1  2 (   1)2
 0
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where the rst inequality follows from 43   32   7 + 3 > 0 for all   .
(iv) The signs of G0006 (1) and G
00
6 (1) are indeterminate. However, if G
00
6 (1)  0, then
G0006 (1)  0 for all   . Two subcases may arise.
(iv-a) If G006 (1)  0, then G0006 (1)  0. Since G0006 (W ) is increasing, G0006 (W )  0 always
holds. Since G006 (1)  0, G006 (W )  0 always holds too, i.e., G06 (W ) is increasing.
(iv-b) If G006 (1) < 0, then G
000
6 (1) is indeterminate. However, since G
000
6 (W ) is increasing
and G006
 
 1
  0, it must be that G006 (W ) < 0 for small W , and then G006 (W )  0 for
large W , i.e., G06 (W ) is U-shaped.
(v) We have
G06 (1) =  2 (1  )3 (2   1 + )
h
2

    +
p
2

(   ) + 2  2   1+ 2i
  2 (1  )3 (2   1 + ) 2

    +
p
2

(   )
 0
where the second inequality holds if and only if   . Since G06 (W ) is either increasing or
U-shaped from (iv-a) and (iv-b), it must be that G6 (W ) is either decreasing or U-shaped.
We have
G6 (1) =
1
2
G06 (1)  0
G6
 
 1

=  
 
1  23  (   1)
2
< 0:
Thus, G6 (W ) < 0 for all W 2 (1;  1].
(vi) Since sgnG6 (W ) = sgnG04 (W ) and G4 (1) = 0, we get G4 (W ) < 0 for all W 2
(1;  1], which implies d()=d > 0.
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Figure 1:  Stable equilibria for τwith =3, c=1, m=1, and f=1/100
Figure 2:  Stable equilibria for c with =3, =1/2, m=1, and f=1/50
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